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APPORTIONMENT OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES*:
"Nothing can be more fallacious than to found our
political calculations on arithmetical principles."
-The Federalist, No. 55.
IN 1950 a census will be made of the United States. On the basis of that
census the House of Representatives must be reapportioned, in order that
each state may have the number of seats in the House to which the latest
figures on its population entitle it. The criterion by which this reapportion-
ment is to be made is set out by Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution, as
amended by the Fourteenth Amendment:
"Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number
of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. - . . The
number of representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty
thousand, but each State shall have at least one representative."
It might seem that apportioning the House according to these directions
is as easy as giving two senators to every state. That it is not so simple is
shown by the controversy which has occurred every decade since the found-
ing of the Republic over the fairest method of implementing the constitu-
tional requirements.'
When the apportionment is made after the 1950 census, it will be made by
one of five methods which have been developed for that purpose. The issue
has already been reopened as to which of these methods comes closest to
meeting the constitutional requirements. 2 But this is not the normal kind
of constitutional issue which can be answered by looking to the words of the
Constitution; the real controversy concerns selection of the method of
apportionment closest to the standard, which the Constitution must have
* This Comment is confined solely to the problem of determining the number of seats
in the House which should be alloted to each state, and does not consider the apportion-
ing of that quota to districts within the several states. That latter issue has been coin-
petently and exhaustively treated by ScHm-CKEBIER, CONGRESSIONAL ApronTniox ,NT
127-92 (1941), and, more recently, by a Note, 56 YALE L. J. 127 (1946).
1. The first of the twelve amendments proposed as a Bill of Rights provided for a
gradual change in the maximum number of representatives from one to each thirty
thousand population to one to each fifty thousand, 1 STAT. 97 (1789), but the amendment
was not ratified. President Washington chose the Apportionment Act of 1792 for the
first exercise of his veto power, claiming that the apportionment proposed was unconisti-
tutional. 3 ANNALs OF CONG. 539 (1792). 5 MARSHALL, LIr oF WAsHINGrTON 324 (1807)
describes the Presidential veto and the ensuing passage of a bill using a different method
of apportionment, and optimistically concludes: "Thus was this interesting part of tile
American Constitution finally settled." The four other methods which have since been
used in making apportionments and the three additional methods which are currently coin-
peting for favor tend to refute Marshall's pronouncement.
2. Professor Emeritus Walter F. Willcox, of Cornell, the dominant scholar on the
1949] APPORTIONMENT OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIES 1301
implied, of being fair to every state. To resolve that controversy, mathe-
matics must come to the aid of law.
Three things must be determined in apportioning the House: the pro-
portion of the national population which resides in each state; the total
size of the House; and the number of representatives to be alloted to each
state in order that its proportion of the total membership of the House may
most closely approximate its proportion of the total population. The first
of these determinations is not a mere matter of counting noses,' but the
Bureau of the Census is now so adept at its task that it can be expected to
report correctly the population of each state.4 Interest today centers, there-
fore, on the more difficult problems of deciding on the size of the House and
equitably allocating that number of representatives to the several states.
subject of apportionment for the last forty years, has already announced his support of
proposals to reduce the size of the House each decade and to make the apportionment
by a method different from that now provided for by law, for whichl he finds more sup-
port in the Constitution. WNillcox, Letter to the Editor, N. Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1949, § 5,
p. 8, col. 5. See note 32 infira.
Prof. WIillcox has always maintained that the problem of apportionment is v-,holly
a political problem, rather than a mathematical one, and his conclusions have not
always been in accord with the bulk of thinking in this field. Since he is not a
mathematician he seems to have been guilty of occasional unimportant errors con-
cerning technical matters during the give and take of testimony before Cngresirnal
committees. Other writers have found it good sport to collect Willcox's lapsi lin gac
into chapters entitled "Errata in the Current Literature," HTu, i-=Gro:., '.rL'Tuoos *'
APpoRo.N ri- IN CoxGRzss 37-40 (SEN. Doc No. 304, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 1940);
cf. SCHIIECIMIEP, CoxGPXss1oN.. APPoRrTIONrMNT 60-8 (1941); or to scatter correc-
tions of such errors in pontifical footnotes throughout their work, see, e.g., Chafee, Con-
gressiozal Reapportionment, 42 H,,=. L. Rxv. 1015 (1929) passim. Such criticism should
not diminish Prof. Willcox's stature as a thinker who has attacked the problems of Con-
gressional apportionment with great originality, forcefulness, and devotion.
3. Proposals are frequently advanced to exclude aliens from the enumeration of
the population for apportionment purposes, or to base apportionments upon the number
of votes cast in the last Presidential election, and thus effectuate the provision of the
Fourteenth Amendment that a state's representation be decreased for any persQns the
state disenfranchises. Although persuasive arguments have been advanced on behalf of
such proposals, Scia cxmzIzn, op. cit. supra note 2, at 06-106, it is unnecessary to con-
sider their merits. The easy answer is that neither proposal is constitutional, as Schmecl:e-
bier admits, and a constitutional amendment along such lines would have no chance of
ratification.
4. It has not always been so. "In 1870 there were many odd errors made in certain
classes of statistics. There were reported 131 out of 151 colored children in one family
as insane in a city in Massachusetts; infants died of delirium tremens, and old men of
teething, and people were frozen to death South in August, and sunstruck North in
January." 11 CoN-G. REc. App. 99 (1881). And even in this century, it has been an
unimaginative Congressman indeed who was unable to give good reasons why census
figures unfavorable to his state should not be relied upon. The statement of Representa-
tive Rhodes, of Missouri, is typical: ". . . I wish to protest against the passage of such
legislation as will reduce the membership of my State in this body; and I vill tell you
why. At the time the census was taken last year an unusual industrial condition prevailed
in Missouri. Thousands and tens of thousands of our working people at that time were
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SIZE OF THE HOUSE
Although it is commonly thought that the size of the House is permanently
fixed at 435, Congress has the power to increase or decrease the number of
representatives to any figure it may choose,5 and history indicates that
Congress is not likely to be hesitant about altering the size of the lower
chamber. Until 1929 no two apportionment acts had ever provided for the
same size House.' In 1850 Congress enacted a measure purporting to limit
the size for all time to 233, 7 but this limitation has been consistently ignored,
The present size of the House was arrived at purely by chance. The ap-
portionment in 1911 s provided for a House of 433 members since that was
absent from the State . . .and had gone into certain industrial centers, such as Cleve-
land and Detroit; but that population is now coming back, it is returning and has returned
very largely." Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Census, 67th
Cong., 1st. Sess. 10-12 (1921). The Hon. John E. Rankin, of Mississippi, complained
that the census failed to show the true population of his state because "[D]uring
the war and just before the war, when labor was scarce, there was a great song that weit
throughout our section among the Negro population to the effect that they could get
better wages elsewhere, and that was a fact at the time, and a great many of them left
the State on that account. For the last 18 months these negroes have been pouring back
into Mississippi and begging the landlords to take them back. . . .They took this census
in January, and in some instances they appointed some old rundown politicians to super-
vise the work, and as a result of this inefficient census taking a great part of the agri-
cultural population of my State will be deprived of representation on the floor of this
House." Id. at 65. Representative Rankin also put much stress on the fact that the census
was made during the winter, when Mississippi has an excessive amount of rainfall, instead
of in May and June. Ibid.
5. The Constitution makes no provision as to the size of the House except to direct
that there shall not be more than one representative to each thirty thousand inhabitants,
and that each state shall have at least one representative. U. S. CoNsr. Art I, § 2.
6. Apportionment acts after each census have provided for a House of the following
sizes:
Constitution 65
















7. 9 STAT. 432 (1850).
8. 37 STAT. 13 (1911).
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the lowest number which would prevent any state from losing a representa-
tive.9 The admission to statehood one year later of Arizona and New Mexico
forced the size of the House to its present level without any thought that a
House of 435 members would be permanent. 10 After the census of 1920 the
House Committee on the Census reported a bill fixing the size of the House
at 483, the smallest size which would cause no state to lose a representative.
The House amended this to provide a body of 435 members, but the Senate
killed the bill because many states would have lost seats. A new measure
was then reported which would have apportioned 460 members, causing
two states to lose one representative each. By a margin of four votes, the
House defeated this bill. In 1927 another bill which would have provided a
House of 435 members was defeated."
In order to prevent the recurrence of a decade without an apportionment,
Congress passed a Permanent Apportionment Act in 1929.12 This provided
that after each census the Secretary of the Interior should submit a table
showing the number of representatives to be alloted to each state under the
two most important methods of apportionment, equal proportions and
major fractions. If Congress failed to act within sixty days, the allotment
based on the method used in the last previous apportionment was to go into
effect automatically. It was necessary in the act to specify for what size
House the Secretary of the Interior should prepare his tables, and Congress
wrote into law the figure 435. The Permanent Apportionment Act was
amended in 1941 13 to require use of the method of equal proportions, but
the size of the House was not changed.
The present "fixed" limit on the size of the House means that some states
will have their number of representatives reduced at any apportionment.1 4
The difficulties which this causes should not be underestimated. The legis-
latures of the states in question must choose between reapportioning their
states or, by default, permitting their entire Congressional delegations to
be elected at large. 5 The apportionment acts from 1842 to 1911, which
9. H. R. REP. No. 12, 62d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1911).
10. The committee report on the 1911 act opposed any attempt to limit permanently
the size of the House, and expressed doubt as to the constitutionality of making appor-
tionments on any other than an ad hoc basis. Id. at 5.
11. ScHaacKinmR, op. cit. supra note 2, at 120-1, summarizes this and gives citations
of the unsuccessful bills.
12. 46 STAT. 21 (1929), as amended, 54 ST.T. 162 (1940).
13. 55 STAT. 761 (1941), 2 U. S. C. §2a (1946).
14. The sweeping population movements of this decade will make this a particularly
irksome problem in the apportionment after the 1950 census. Apportionment by each of
the five possible methods according to July, 1948, population estimates shows that in a
House of 435 members, the delegations of eleven states would be reduced by tvo methods,
the delegations of twelve states by two methods, and the delegations of seventeen states
by one method. See Appendix B, infra, p. 1386.
15. 55 STAT. 762(1941), 2 U.S.C. § 2a(c) (5) (1946) ; cf. Smiley v. Holm, 235 U.S.
355, 374 (1932).
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invariably required that representatives be elected from districts, are evi-
dence that sound public policy is opposed to electing Congressional del-
egations at large.15 But legislatures attempting to conform to the public
policy of electing Congressmen by districts are forced by political expedi-
ency to gerrymander, and gerrymandering has the effect of making repre-
sentative government less representative by shaping districts to sterilize
as many minority votes as possible.
The classic arguments in favor of limiting the size of the House are that a
larger House would be administratively unwieldy, and that it would more
likely be guided by passion than by reason. "Had every Athenian citizen
been a Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob'" 11
But such argument presupposes that the House is still a deliberative body
and that its most important function is its floor debate. Every page of the
Congressional Record testifies eloquently that this is not the case. The rules
limiting debate and the great power wielded by the leadership reduce floor
proceedings to a few meaningless speeches for the sake of the record. The
important function of the House today is that of a huge voting machine
registering the temper of the populace.
And a larger House would be a more precise instrument for indicating this
public sentiment. Today each Congressman represents-in theory-301,000
persons. Clearly it would be impossible to select 301,000 persons with such
similar views that they could be adequately represented by one person.
When it is considered that the normal Congressional district does not con-
sist of persons chosen for their homogeneous views, but rather of persons
happening to live in a particular area, it is apparent how unrepresentative
government can be. Congressional districts of 30,000, the constitutional
minimum, would not be a complete cure for this situation, but they would
go a long way toward eliminating districts in which silk stocking areas are
combined with slums.
Other advantages inhere in an increase of the size of the House. The larger
the House, the more exactly each state's proportion of the total membership
can be made to coincide with its proportion of the total population of the
nation. And the smaller the size of the average Congressional district, the
more difficult it becomes for a state legislature to gerrymander the state.
A large House would obviate the dilemma presently confronting the lower
chamber of having either to cut down the number of committees-and so
increase the amount and complexity of the work within each committee--
or to require each Congressman to serve on so many committees that he is
unable to do a thorough job on any of them."' A large House would mate-
16. The requirement that representatives be elected from districts has never been
enforced. See 1 HINDS, PR cDmrNTs oF THE Hous. or REPRESENTATIVES 170-2 (1907).
17. THE FEDERALiST, No. 55, at 361 (Modern Library ed. 1937).
18. The Congressional Reorganization Act of 1946, 60 STAT. 812 (1946), reduced the
number of standing committees in the House from forty-eight to nineteen, in an effort to
reduce the number of committee assignments of each representative. But the complexity
[Vol. 58" 1301364
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rially increase the number of representatives with special competences to
give expert consideration to the wide variety of subjects which now affect
the national interest, while smaller constituencies would enable each Con-
gressman to give closer attention to the individual needs of the citizens he
represents.' 9 And finally it just makes sense that as the government and
the nation grow bigger, so should the House of Representatives grow bigger.
These advantages of a large House could be obtained by one drastic in-
crease in the membership of that body, but it seems more in accord vith the
democratic tradition to build up the size of the House by smaller but fre-
quent increases. Such a plan would permit the House to adapt its methods
and techniques to a larger membership in a more gradual manner. The
simple way to provide for such increases is to amend the Permanent Ap-
portionment Act to provide that after each census the Secretary of the
Interior prepare a new apportionment on the basis of the smallest size House
in which no state would lose a member, rather than on the basis of a House
of 435 members. 20
PROBLEMS OF ALLOTING REPRESENTATIVFS TO STATES
After the size of the House has been determined and the population of
each state and of the nation is lmown, the most difficult problem in appor-
tionment is still to be met-the allocation of representatives to states.
of the work is such that it is impossible for a small number of committees to do a
satisfactory job. Three months after the Eightieth Congress had been organized-the
first Congress to be organized in the new "streamlined" manner-a suprstructure of
two special committees and 119 subcommittees had been erected above the nineteen com-
mittees into which the Reorganization Act had divided the House. N. Y. Times, March
20, 1947, p. 23, col. 1.
19. A senatorial secretary is quoted as saying: "Today senators are just messenger
boys. Remember, the Federal Government has something to say about the house you
live in, your wages, fuel, food and clothing prices, the raw material for your factory-
all this in addition to the usual Federal activities. No wonder the citizens need help. And
even when it's something that doesn't concern Washington, they write anyvay." White,
Anything for a Constitunct, Saturday Evening Post, Oct. 26, 1946, p. 30, 59. Representa-
tives, generally even better known to the voters than are Senators, are likely to be even
more burdened with constituents' requests.
20. On the basis of July, 1948, population estimates, a House of 490 members w.,ould
be required in order for no state to lose a seat if the method of equal proportions, for
example, were used in madng the apportionment. In a House of 461 members, only
Arkansas would lose a seat, while all other states remained unchanged or gained. See
Appendix B, infra, p. 1386.
Estimates of maximum population range from "perhaps 165 or 170 million" to be
reached about 1980, Ogburn, Who Will Be Who in 19S0, N.Y. Times 'Magazine,
May 30, 1948, p. 23, 34, to "about 196,681,000" to come "well after the year 2,OD," Prof.
Raymond Pearl, quoted in Potter, The Story Behind the Story, Esquire, farch, 1949,
p. 40. Since the Constitution limits the size of the House to one representative to every
thirty thousand inhabitants, the maximum size of the House under the rule contained in
the text would be 5100 members by the lower population estimate, or 6556 members by
the higher estimate. But the size of the House would not reach such a figure until several
centuries after the population had reached its maximum.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Instinctively the proper method would seem to be to divide the number of
representatives into the population of the nation to find out how many
people there should be to each representative. This figure would then be
divided into the population of each state, and the result would be the num-
ber of representatives to which the state is entitled. The trouble is the ex-
treme unlikelihood that a state's quota will ever be an exact whole number,
and it is somewhat difficult to elect a fraction of a Congressman. Yet one
state may deserve 3.01 representatives, and another 3.99. Are they each
to be given three? Or each four? Or should the first state be given three and
the second four representatives? Congress has had much difficulty in an-
swering such questions so as to produce the least inequity, and only within
this century has there been any valid mathematical analysis of the problem.
Terminology
In order to simplify the discussion of possible methods of apportionment,
it is desirable first to define certain of the terms most often used.21
The ratio is the figure obtained by dividing the number of representatives
to be apportioned into the total population of the nation. Thus the 1940
census listed a population of 131,006,184; 435 representatives were to be
apportioned. The ratio, therefore, is 131,006,184 divided by 435, or 301,164.
Modern methods of apportionment make no use of the ratio. While it is
possible to derive a figure from them, these artificial ratios play no part in
the apportionment process, and are of interest only to Congressmen unable
to follow the intricacies of the mathematical methods. 2
The quota is the number of representatives which a state is awarded under
a method of apportionment, to be differentiated from the exact quota, which
is the number of representatives to which the state is entitled. Under early
methods of apportionment the ratio was divided into the population of a
state to determine its exact quota. If the ratio was 300,000 a state with a
population of 725,000 would have an exact quota of 2.42. The quota which
would be alloted it would be either 2 or 3, depending on the method of ap-
portionment being used.
Where the exact quota consists of a whole number and a fraction, the
fraction is classified as a major fraction if it is equal to or greater than one-
half, and minor fraction if it is less than one-half.
The average district is the average population per district in a particular
state. It is determined by dividing the population of the state by the quota
which a particular apportionment assigns the state, so that it is also the
21. The terminology employed here follows generally that of ScMECrKEIER, op. Cil,
supra note 2, since that text, a 233-page study for the Brookings Institution, bids fair to
be the definitive work on Congressional apportionment.
22. Under the method of apportionment used after the 1940 census, any figure from
300,473 to 300,796 could have been assumed as the "ratio." 300,635 was the figure most
used in Congressional debates. As is shown in the text, the natural ratio was 301,164.
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average population per representative. The apportionment of 1940 gave
Connecticut, for example, a quota of six representatives for its population
of 1,710,112. Dividing the population by six, the average district is found
to be 285,019.
The individual share in a representative, or, more briefly, the share, is
derived by dividing the quota for a state by the population of the state, so
that mathematically it is the reciprocal of the average district. Using the
1940 figures, the share for a Connecticut individual was six divided by
1,710,112, or .00000351. For the sake of simplicity, it is customary to
multiply this figure by one million, and speak of share per million of pop-
ulation. For Connecticut this would be 3.51 per million.
The absolute difference between two numbers is determined by subtracting
the smaller from the larger. The relatie difference is the percentage by
which the larger exceeds the smaller. The absolute difference between a
share of 10.00 and a share of 11.00 is 1.00, exactly the same as the absolute
difference between a share of 5.00 and a share of 6.00. But the relative
difference in the first case is the absolute difference of 1.00 divided by 10.00,
or 10%, while the relative difference in the second case is 1.00 divided by
5.00, or 20%.
Each of the modem methods of apportioning the House uses a priori ,
list which shows the quota to which each state is entitled for any particular
size of the House. As will be seen later, each mathematical formula for
apportionment ends up by giving a list of fractions known as multipliers.23
The population of each state is multiplied by each multiplier taken from
tables prepared for that particular method. This gives for each state a list
of numbers of decreasing magnitude, known as rank indices. The priority
list is then constructed by first listing each state once to comply with the
Congressional guarantee that each state shall have at least one representa-
tive. All the rank indices are then arranged in a single series in descending
order of size, so that the largest rank index indicates which state should be
awarded the forty-ninth representative, the next largest the fiftieth, and
so on. For any particular size of the House all that is necessary is to count
the number of times a state appears on the priority list up to that size of the
House to see how many representatives the state should have in a House
of the specified size. An example of the construction of a priority list is
given in an appendix.2 4
Paradoxes
Any method of apportionment which involves a fixed ratio is subject to
the population paradox, in which an increase in the total population may
23. As is seen in the development of the modern methods of apportionment, p. 1371
infra, the mathematical processes from which each method is derived yield a series of
divisors to be successively divided into the population oi a state. It is purely as a matter of
convenience that the reciprocals of these divisors are taken and used as multipliers.
24. Appendix A, infra, p. 1384.
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result in a decrease in the size of the House.25 The classic hypothetical ex-
ample shows how it would be possible for the size of the House to drop from
435 to 391 while the population of the United States is increasing from
102,750,113 to 102,958,798 if a fixed ratio of 250,000 were being employed.
20
The theory of the example is that one state which originally had just a few
more persons than it needed to be entitled to a certain quota might increase
its population so that it would have just a few less people than it needed
for an additional representative. Its population would have increased al-
most 250,000 but it would get no larger quota. But another state Which also
started out with just a few more people than it needed for a certain quota
would have to lose only a very few people to fall below the dividing line and
lose a representative. The combined population of the two states is increased
almost 250,000 but their combined number of representatives is decreased
by one.
The Alabama paradox to \vhich some apportionment methods are subject
was first discovered in 1881 when tables were prepared showing the ap-
portionment for a House of several different sizes. In a House of 298 mem-
bers, Alabama's quota was seven. If the House were increased to 299,
Alabama would get the additional representative, so that its quota would
be eight. But mirabile diclu, in a House of 300 members Alabama's quota
would shrink to seven again. And in a House of 301, Alabama would once
again get an eighth seat, this time permanently. Since that time, any
situation in which an increase in the size of the House decreases the size of
the delegation from a particular state has been known as the Alabama
paradox."N
Such paradoxes as these were the curse of early haphazard apportionment
methods. They cannot occur in the modem methods which are the product
of more incisive mathematical analysis.
OUTMODED METHODS OF APPORTIONIENT
Before considering the modem mathematical methods of apportionment,
it is instructive to consider those methods which have been used and dis-
carded or proposed and rejected heretofore.
25. See Chafee, supra note 2, at 1025-6.
26. Full details of this example may be found in HUNTINGTON, Op. cit. supra note 2,
at 18-19.
27. For an explanation of the Alabama paradox and why it occurs, see the letter from
General F. A. Walker to Hon. S. S. Cox, printed in APPORTrONMENT UNDER TENTh
CENsus 19 (1881). An extreme example of the Alabama paradox was discovered in a
proposed apportionment after the census of 1900 when Maine had three seats in a House
of 382, four seats in a House of 383, 384, or 385, three in a House of 386, four out of
387 or 388, three in a House of 389 or 390, and four in a House of 391. "Now you see
it and now you don't," commented Representative Littlefield of Maine. "In Maine comes
and out she goes. The House increases in size and still she is out. It increases a little
more in size, and then, forsooth, in she comes. A further increase, and out she goes, and
then a little further increase and in she comes. God help the State of Maine when mathe-
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M1'ethod of Rejected Fractions
The first five apportionments, up to 1830, were made by a method devised
by Thomas Jefferson known as the method of rejected fractions. In this
method the natural ratio was found and the exact quota for each state com-
puted, and the states were assigned a quota equal to the whole number part
of the exact quota, with any fractional part of the exact quota rejected. By
this method a state with an exact quota of 3.99 and another with an exact
quota of 3.01 would each be given three seats in the House. In addition to
this manifest inequity, this method is subject to the population paradox, in
which an increase in the population may reduce the size of the House.
MUethwd of Included Fractions
A companion method to rejected fractions is the method of included
fractions, in which the exact quotas are computed and each state given the
next highest whole number of representatives, so that the states with exact
quotas of 3.01 and 3.99 would each be assigned four seats. This method
is also manifestly inequitable, it is subject to the population paradox, and has
never been used in an apportionment.
Method of r84o
The apportionment after the 1840 census was made according to a method
devised by Daniel Webster 23 which gave a state a seat for every whole number
in its exact quota and an additional seat if the fractional part of the quota
exceeded one-half. By this method the state with an exact quota of 3.01
would be assigned three seats, while the state with the exact quota of 3.99
would be assigned four seats. This method is subject to the population para-
dox, and further it is impossible to determine in advance what the size of the
House will be.25
Vinton. Method
Apportionments from 1850 to 1900 were made by the Vinton method,
named after the Congressman who authored it. This method assigned to
each state a quota equal to the whole number part of its exact quota, and
awarded the remaining seats necessary to fill out the House to the states
with the largest fractions in their exact quotas. This is the method which
was being used when the Alabama paradox first appeared. A suggested
improvement was devised, known as the modified Vinton method, which
would have assigned seats for whole numbers and given the remaining seats
matics reach for her and undertake to strike her down in this manner in connection with
her representatives on this floor-more cruel even than the chairman of this great com-
mittee." 34 CoNG. REc. 593 (1901).
28. Report of Select Comnzittec on Rcprcscntation, SE:T. Doc. No. 119, 22d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1832).
29. For an interesting example of a difficulty of the Webster Method, see Hurxnua-
TOi, op. cit. supra note 2, at 33.
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to the states whose fractional quotas divided by their populations were
largest. This modification is still subject to the Alabama paradox.
Method of Geometric Fractions
The method of geometric fractions would have given each state a rep-
resentative for each whole number in its exact quota and one additional
representative if the exact quota was greater than the geometric mean of
the number of seats already given the state and the number of seats already
given plus one. For example, a state with an exact quota of 1.40 would be
given one seat and a state with an exact quota of 1.42 would be given two
seats, since the geometric mean of one and two is the square root of one
multiplied by two, or 1.414. This method is subject to the population
paradox, and has never been used in an apportionment.
M fethod of Harmonic Fractions
The method of harmonic fractions would have given a state an extra seat
for its fraction if the exact quota of the state exceeded the harmonic mean
of the number of seats already assigned the state and that number plus one.
The harmonic mean of two numbers is twice their product divided by their
sum, so that a state with an exact quota of 1.32 would be given one rep-
resentative while a state with a quota of 1.35 would be assigned two seats,
since the harmonic mean of one and two is 1.33. This method was proposed
by Prof. James Dean in 1832 as an appendix to a famous report on apportion-
ment by Daniel Webster." It is subject to the population paradox, and has
never been used in an apportionment.
Minimum Range; Inverse M11inimum Range
Minimum range and inverse minimum range are not properly apportion-
ment methods, but rather are tests by which to measure the success of an
apportionment." The test of minimum range says that an apportionment
is satisfactory when the difference between the largest and the smallest
average district has been reduced to a minimum; the test of inverse min-
imum range seeks to minimize the difference between the largest and small-
est individual share. Apportionments satisfactory by this method may
contain the Alabama paradox, and the tests are no longer in use.1
2
30. Report of Select Committee on Representation, SFx. Doc. No. 119, 22d Cong.,
1st Sess. 19-21 (1832).
31. See SCHMECKEBnM, op. cit. stupra note 2, at 81-5.
32. But Willcox, supra note 2, apparently is urging a process based on the test of
minimum range: "The decisive question for Congress is: Does an apportionment under
the proposed method give results which come nearer to meeting the requirement of the
Constitution than those reached by the present or any other method? The unattainable
ideal is so to apportion seats as to equalize the district population of the states .... The
measure of nearness to this ideal which seems the best and simplest and most likely to
appeal to Congress is the difference between the largest and the smallest district popula-
tion."
[Vol. 58: 13601370
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Mlrethod of Alternate Ratios
Although the method of alternate ratios, devised by Dr. Joseph A. Hill,
chief statistician of the Bureau of the Census, was never used for an appor-
tionment, it was the first sophisticated method to be devised, and pointed
the way to modern mathematical methods of apportionment.33 This method
gave a seat for each whole number in the exact quota. A priority list was
then prepared by computing for each state the geometric mean of the aver-
age district if an additional representative be given the state and the aver-
age district if an additional representative be denied. Representatives could
be given to states in the order in which they appeared on the priority list
until the House reached any predetermined size. This method is subject to
the Alabama paradox.
MODERN METHODS OF APPORTIONIENT
In 1832 a committee under the chairmanship of Daniel Webster reported
to the Senate in part:
"The constitution, therefore, must be understood not as enjoining
an absolute relative equality-because that would be demanding an
impossibility-but as requiring of Congress to make the apportion-
ment of representatives among the several States according to their
respective numbers, as near as may be. That which cannot be done
perfectly, must be done in a manner as near perfection as can be. If
exactness cannot, from the nature of things, be attained, then the
greatest practicable approach to exactness ought to be made." 34
This classic statement is the key to present methods which are based on
making the quota a state is given "as near as may be" to the exact quota to
which the state mathematically is entitled.
33. Dr. Hill's statement of his method is found at H. I. REP. No. 12, 62 Cong., Ist
Sess. 43 (1911). In submitting the method he said: "It was not my e.xpcetation that this
method would be applied in the pending apportionment." Ibid. And in a letter to a scholar
who endorsed his method, he said: "I did not think it advisable at this time to urge the
adoption of my method or agitate for it, especially in view of the fact that, as applied to
the existing states, it gives e-xactly the same result in the apportionment of 433 representa-
tives as the method endorsed by Professor Willcox and favored by the Committee. The
only difference would be that my method would bring in the territory of New M14exico,
when it becomes a state, with two representatives instead of one. I was not disposed to
hold a brief for New Mexico or make that territory my client; I think one representative
is quite enough for that state. At any rate I am satisfied that the Committee would not
have endorsed the method at the present time, even if I had brought to bear all the pres-
sure at my command." Letter to Prof. Irving Fisher from Dr. Joseph A. Hill, dated
Oct. 5, 1911, in the Yale University Library. But the method of alternate ratios vas
found to be subject to the Alabama paradox, and by 1927 Dr. Hill could say, "I have no
method of my own; the method of equal proportions has superseded my method." Hu:rr-
iNGToN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 29.
34. Report of Select Committce on Representation, S=x. Doc. No. 119, 22d Cong., 1st
Sess. 4 (1832) (italics are those of the original author).
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Fundamental Theorem of Apportionment
If the populations of tvo states are A and B, and the quotas assigned to
them are a and b, in an ideal apportionment A:B::a:b. This proportion can
be expressed in the form of an equation in four ways: A Ia = B /b; or a /A
= b/B; or A 1B = a /b; or B /A = b/a. In practice it is impossible to satisfy
any of these equations exactly, but it may be set out as the Fundamental
Theorem of Congressional apportionment that in each of these equations
the left side of the equation should be made "as near as may be" equal to
the right side of the equation.
These four equations may be expressed verbally as follows: the average
district in each state should be as nearly equal as possible (A /a : B/b);
the individual share in each state should be as nearly equal as possible (a/A
= b/B); if state A is twice as populous as state B, it should have twice
as many representatives, as nearly as may be (A 1B = a/b); if state B is
half as populous as state A, it should have half as many representatives,
as nearly as may be (B/IA = b/a). Only one further postulate need be as-
sumed in order to derive from each of these equations a mathematical
method of making an apportionment so as to satisfy the particular equation
from which the method is constructed: in a satisfactory apportionment it
should be impossible to make one of the above equations any more nearly
equal by a transfer of a representative from one state to another.
Method of Major Fractions
Of the four methods which may be simply derived from the equations of
the Fundamental Theorem, only the method of major fractions has ever
been used in an actual apportionment. This method takes the equation
a/A = b/B and proposes to reduce to a minimum the absolute difference
between the individual shares in any two states. This difference is expressed
in the form a/A - b/B, and is used as a test to decide whether it would be
fairer to assign an additional representative to state A rather than to state B.
If the additional representative is assigned to state A, the absolute difference
of the individual shares would be: (a + 1)/A - b/B1. If the additional rep-
resentative be given to state B, the absolute difference would be (b + 1) /B
-a /A.
If the assignment of the additional representative to A is correct, the
absolute difference will be smaller than if the additional representative had
been assigned to B, or:
a-+1 b b+1- a
A B < B A
Transposing terms:
a+I a b+1 b
A B B
and grouping"
2a + 1 2b + 1
A B
[Vol. 58: 13601372
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Inverting the inequality, this becomes:
A B
2a + I 2b + Z
and multiplying each side of the inequality by two:
A B
a+2 b +
This inequality means that it will be fairer to assign an additional repre-
sentative to state A than to state B if the population of A divided by its
present number of representatives plus one-half is greater than the popula-
tion of state B divided by its present quota plus one-half.
From the test just found it is possible to construct a priority list by which
to apportion the House according to the method of major fractions. After
each state has been given the one representative the Constitution requires,
the next seat should be given to the state whose population divided by 1.5
is greatest. The same state should be given the fiftieth seat if its population
divided by 2.5 is greater than that of any other state divided by 1.5. And
so it goes: the population of each state is divided successively by 1.5, 2.5,
3.5, . . . , and the rank indices thus obtained are arranged in a priority
list. The apportionment made from that priority list will have a smalle-
absolute difference between the individual shares of any two states than
would any other apportionment.
The method of major fractions was devised by Prof. Walter F. Willcox,
of Cornell University, in 1910, and was used in the apportionments of 1911
and 1931." 5 It was one of the two methods provided for by the Permanent
Apportionment Act of 1929, but the act has since been amended to eliminate
this method. As will be seen, the method of major fractions tends to favor
slightly the larger states.3"
M1ethod of the Harmonic .llean
The method of the harmonic mean uses the equation A /a = B lb and
proposes to minimize the absolute difference between the average districts
in any two states. By manipulation similar to that demonstrated for the
method of major fractions it is found that this test is satisfied by assigning
an additional representative to a state when the population of the state
divided by the harmonic mean of the state's present quota and its present
quota plus one is greater than the similar figure for any other state.- The
35. The apportionment of 1931 was made under the Permanent Apportionment Act,
which authorized the use of either the method of major fractions or the method of equal
proportions, and provided that if Congress did not make an apportionment, the method
used in the last preceding apportionment should be put into effect. As chance w.-ould have
it, equal proportions and major fractions gave identical results in 1931. Since major
fractions had been used to make the last preceding apportionment, in 1911, it must tech-
nically be regarded as the method employed in 1931.
36. Seep. 13S0 infra.
37. Starting with the equation A/a= B/b, the method of harmonic means proposes
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harmonic mean of two numbers is twice their product divided by their sum,
so that the quantities by which state populations are divided to prepare
1X2 2X3 3X4
rankindices are:2 X 2 X 2 X +1 +2' 2+3,X 3+4.
The method of the harmonic mean was devised by Prof. Edward V.
Huntington, of Harvard University, in 1921. It has never been used in an
apportionment. As will be seen, it tends to favor slightly the smaller states, s
to reduce the absolute difference between the average district in the two states, A/a-B/b,
to the smallest possible quantity. If an additional seat is allotted to A, this difference is
B/b-A/(a + 1), while if B is given the added seat, the difference becomes A/a-
B/(b + 1). The additional seat should be given to A if the absolute difference in that case
is less than the absolute difference if the seat be given to B, which may be expressed:
B A A B
b - a+1 a b+l
Transposing this may be written:
B + B <A A
b b+1 a + 1
Reversing the inequality and factoring terms:
1+A (IB+%1 ) > B( +
a. a±1 b\, b-J
The harmonic mean (H) of two numbers is twice their prcduct divided by their sum.
The harmonic mean of a and a +1 (H of a and a ± 1) "s ~~2(a)(a The reciprocal isThe hrmonc   1  + ) +  r a s"
found to be: (
I 1 _ (a)+(a+l)H --r2z(a)Ca + 1) 2 (a) (a + 1)
\.(a) +(a+ 1).]
Multiplying each side of the equation by two:
2 _ (a)+(a+1) = a + a+1 _ _
H a (a+ 1) a (a + 1) a (a+ 1) a a+1
The end result of this manipulation with the harmonic mean is seen to be identical with
the factor being multiplied by A in the inequality developed above. Since the same result
just demonstrated for the harmonic mean of a and a + 1 can be demonstrated for the har-
monic mean of b and b + 1, the inequality may be written:
2A 2B
Hofaanda.+-1 Hofbandb+1
Or finally, dividing by two:
A B
Hofaanda±l Hofbandb+l"
From this it is seen that if absolute differences in average districts are the criteria, a
state should be awarded an additional representative whenever its population divided by the
harmonic mean of the quota presently assigned it and the next higher quota is greater
than the similiar quantity for any other state.
38. See p. 1380 infra.
19491 APPORTIONMENT OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 1375
Method of Smallest Divisors
The method of smallest divisors takes the equation A /B = alb, with A
being over-represented in comparison with B, and transposes it to the form:
a-b(AIB) = 0.
The left-hand side of the equation is known as the absolute representation
surplus, and the method of smallest divisors proposes so to apportion seats
in the House that the absolute representation surplus between any two
states cannot be reduced by transferring a representative from one state
to the other. An eminent authority has termed this test "more artificial and
less important" than the tests employed in the methods of major fractions,
the harmonic mean, or equal proportions, 9 but in many ways this test seems
to be the method of examining the equality of an apportionment which
would occur instinctively. The layman who knows that state A is twvice as
populous as state B, and that state B has two representatives would be
naturally inclined to multiply two by two, and look askance if state A were
given five representatives instead of the four to which it seems entitled.
The test of the method of smaller divisors is satisfied by assigning an
additional seat to a state when the population of the state divided by the
quota already assigned it is greater than the population of any other state
divided by the present quota of such other state.' O The divisors which are
39. See note 43 infra.
40. The representation surplus is in the form, a-b (A/B), or b-a (B/A). If an
additional seat be allotted state A, its surplus will be (a + 1)-b (A/B), while if state B
gets the seat, its surplus will be (b + 1)- -a (B/A). If the assignment of the seat to
state A is correct, by the test of the method of smallest divisors, then:
(a+ 1)-b(A/B) < (b+ 1)-a(BIA).
Upon transposing terms the inequality becomes:
(a+ 1) +a(B/A) < (b+ 1) +b (A/B).
Reducing each side of the inequality to a common denominator:
A+aA+aB < B+bA+bB
A B
This may be simplified:
+ a(A+B) < 1+ b(A+B)
A B
Subtracting unity from each side, and then dividing by (A + B):
a b
-




Thus it is seen that an apportionment can be made which will minimize the absolute
representation surplus if an additional seat be given a state whenever its population divided
by its present quota exceeds the population of any other state divided by that state's
present quota.
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used to prepare the priority list for this method are, therefore, simply 1, 2,
3 ..... The method of smallest divisors was devised by Professor Hunting-
ton in 1922, and has neverbeen used in an apportionment. It tends to favor
smaller states to an even greater extent than the method of the harmonic
mean. 41
Method of Greatest Divisors
The last of the four equations derived from the Fundamental Theorem,
B /A = b /a, is used by the method of greatest divisors, which proposes to
minimize what it terms the absolute representation deficiency. The absolute
representation deficiency is the quantity, a(B 1A) - b, when state B is
under-represented relative to state A. When A is under-represented relative
to B, the deficiency takes the form, b(A /B) - a. Suppose, for example,
that state A has a population of 1,200,000 and B a population of 600,000,
while a proposed apportionment gives A five representatives and B only
two. The absolute representation deficiency relative to state B is:
5(600,000/1,200,000) - 2 = 5/2 - 2 = Y2.
If a representative were transferred from A's quota to B's, the deficiency
relative to state A would be:
3(1,200,000/600,000) - 4 = 6 - 4 = 2.
Since the deficiency is less as the apportionment stands, the proposed trans-
fer should not be made.
The test of the method of greatest divisors is satisfied by assigning an
additional seat to a state when the population of the state divided by its
present quota plus one is greater than the population of any other state
divided by the present quota of such other state plus one.42 The divisors
41. See p. 1380 infra.
42. The representation deficiency is of the form, a (B/A)- b, or b (A/B) - a. If
an additional seat be allotted state A the deficiency with regard to state B is (a + 1) (B/A)
- b, while if state B gets the seat, the deficiency with regard to state A will be
(b + 1) (A/B) -a. If the assignment of the seat to state A is correct, when measured
by the test of minimal absolute representation deficiency, then:
(a + 1) (B/A) - b < (b + 1) (A/B) - a.
Subtracting unity from each side of the inequality:
(a--.1) (BIA)- (b +1) < (b + 1) (A/B) -a+ 1).
Transposing terms:
(a + 1) (BIA) + (a + 1) < (b + 1) (A/B)+(b+ 1).
Factoring each side of the inequality:
(a + s1) (1 a1)<(b ( oe + I
The second factor on each side may be placed over a common denominator:
lVol. 58:13601376
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used to prepare a priority list for this method of apportionment are, there-
fore, simply 2, 3, 4 ....
The method of greatest divisors was devised by Prof. Victor d'Hondt, of
the University of Ghent, in 1885. The test which it employs has been de-
scribed, along with that of the method of smallest divisors, as "more arti-
ficial and less important" than that of the three other methods of apportion-
ment; " but, as was said in connection with the smallest divisors test, it
seems to be a test which would occur instinctively to the average man. The
greatest divisors method has never been used in an apportionment. It tends
to favor larger states to an even greater extent than does the method of
major fractions.4 4
JlIethod of Eqzual Proportions
The four methods of apportionment which have been presented will each
equalize representation by one of the four tests suggested by the Funda-
mental Theorem. A fifth method has been developed which gives an appor-
tionment that satisfies any of the four tests, provided that relative differences
are used to measure inequalities, rather than absolute differences. Starting
from any of the four original equations, it is possible to demonstrate that
relative differences as measured by any of the four tests of an apportionment
can be minimized if an additional representative is given to a state when
the population of the state divided by the geometric mean between its
present quota and its present quota plus one is greater than that quantity
for any other state. 45 The geometric mean between two numbers is equal
Each side may be divided by (A + B) :
a-{-1, bq-1
A B
And finally, taking the reciprocal of each side, and changing the inequality sign:
A B
a+1 b+1
Thus it is seen that an apportionment can be made which vill minimize the abzolute
representation deficiency if an additional seat be given a state whenever its population
divided by its present quota plus one exceeds the population of any other state divided by
the present quota plus one of such other state.
43. The comment that the tests of the methods of greatest divisors and smallest di-
visors are "more artificial and less important" than the tests of major fractions, harmonic
mean, and equal proportions is made by Chafee, sufra note 2, at 10283, n. 36. And
HNG-ro , op. cit. supra note 2, at 14, 15, calls these tests "much more complicated
and artificial than the tests for the three principal methods."
44. See p. 1380 infra.
45. The method of equal proportions may be developed by searching for that method
of apportionment which will make the relative difference in the average districts minimal.
The relative difference in the average districts of t,.,o states may be e.%pressed as
(Bib) - (Ala). For simplicity in development the folloving substitutions will be made:
(Al/a)
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to the square root of the product of the numbers, so that the divisors used
to prepare a priority list for the method of equal proportions are:
V X2, VX3, 3X4....
The method of equal proportions was devised by Professor Huntington
in 1920. It was used in the apportionment of 1941, and is the method pre-
scribed by the Permanent Apportionment Act to be used unless Congress
the average district for state A (A/a) will be termed x; the average district for state B
(B/b) will be termed y; the average district for state A if it is awarded an additional seat
(A/a 1) will be termed x'; the average district for state B if it is awarded an additional
seat (B/b + 1) will be termed y'.
With these substitutions made, the relative difference in average districts between
two states is - If state A is given an additional seat, the relative difference is L--
while if the additional seat goes to state B the relative difference is In order to
minimize the relative difference in average districts, an additional seat should be allotted
to state A when:
Y-X' XY
Upon separating the fractions this becomes:
y x
? ? X,' x y'Z*
And since any number divided by itself equals unity:
y _1<
Adding unity to each side:
y <
Multiplying each side by (x'y'):
a?-'' < xz"y,).
Similar terms may be cancelled:
y(y') <x('').
The inequality can be reversed:
x(x') > y(y).
By the substitution which was made:
x= _A B 
The inequality which has been developed may be translated back into the original terms:
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makes an apportionment on its own. This method is thought to be impartial
as between large and small states/"
The application of the method of equal proportions can be shown by an
example which arose in the apportionment following the 1940 census. The
population of Arkansas was 1,949,398; the population of Michigan was
5,256,106. Controversy developed as to whether the 435th seat in the
House should go to Arkansas, which already had been assigned six seats, or
to Michigan, which had been assigned seventeen. The average districts and
the individual shares under the two possible apportionments were as follov;s:
Averagc Average
Quota District Quota District
Arkansas 6 324,898 7 278,484
Michigan 18 292,006 17 309,183
Absolute difference 32,982 30,699
Relative difference 11.26% 11.02%
Individual Indiridual
Quota Share Quota Share
Arkansas 6 3.0778 7 3.5902
Michigan 18 3.4245 17 3.2343
Absolute difference 0.3467 0.3559
Relative difference 11.26% 11.020
The absolute difference between the average districts-the test used by
the harmonic mean method-is least when the extra seat is given to Ar-
kansas. The absolute difference between the individual shares-the test
A A BB
Or:
a(a +1) b(b + 1)"
The square root of each side of the inequality can be taken:
A B
\/a(a +1) b(b+ 1)
The geometric mean of two numbers is the square root of their product-precisely the
type quantity in the denominators on each side of the inequality sign. Thus it is seen
that if it is desired to minimize the relative difference betveen the average districts among
the states, a seat should be given to a state when its population divided by the geometric
mean of its present quota and its present quota plus one exceeds the similiar quantity for
any other state. And by a development similar to that here, it can readily be shown that
the same method of apportionment will also minimize the relative difference between
individual shares, the relative representation surplus, and the relative representation de-
ficiency.
46. See p. 1380 in ra.
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of the method of major fractions-is at a minimum when the extra seat is
added to Michigan's quota. But no matter whether average districts or
individual shares are compared, the relative difference is smallest when
Arkansas gets a seventh seat, and this is the test used by the method of
equal proportions. Similarly the relative differences would be smallest and
the equal proportions test satisfied by giving the disputed seat to Arkansas
if the absolute representation surpluses or deficiencies were compared.4"
Comparing The Modern Methods
Each of the five modern methods of apportionment may be derived
algebraically from the Fundamental Theorem of Congressional apportion-
ment. Each of the methods involves a test which seems logically satisfying. 49
Each of the methods permits an apportionment to be made by a simple
priority list. None of the methods involves a paradox. But despite these
strong agruments which can be made for any of the other four methods, the
method of equal proportions seems clearly preferable.49 Its greatest ad-
vantage is that it gives an apportionment which is sound by any test, pro-
vided that relative differences are used, while no other method of apportion-
ment will normally satisfy more than one test. It is difficult to defend an
apportionment which seems fair when quotas are divided into populations
but inequitable if populations are divided into quotas." All apportionments
derived from methods other than equal proportions are subject to such
contradictions."
And the method of equal proportions has the tremendous advantage of
being neutral as between large states and small states, while each of the
other four methods tends to favor either large or small states to varying
extents. The results of apportionments by each of the five methods on the
1920 and 1930 census figures illustrate the extent of such tendencies :52
47. The seat was eventually given to Arkansas. See p. 1382 in!ra.
48. Although Chafee and Huntington would disagree with respect to the method
of greatest divisors and the method of smallest divisori. See note 43 supra.
49. The method of equal proportions was recommended as preferable to any other
method by the Advisory Committee to the Director of the Census in 1921, reprinted at 2
Hearings before Committee on the Census on H. R. 13471, 69th Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1927),
and by the National Academy of Sciences in 1929, reprinted at Hearings before the House
Committee on the Census, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 70-1 (1940).
50. "A method theoretically sound must be reversible." Willcox, Thc Apportilninent
of Representatives, 6 Am. EcoN. Rav. Supp. 3, 13 (1916).
51. The reason that reversing the quotient used as a measure leads to different results
in the methods of major fractions and the harmonic mean, while leading to identical re-
sults when measured by equal proportions, is that the first two methods named in-
volve, respectively, the arithmetic and harmonic mean, while the method of equal
proportions is dependent on the geometric mean. The geometric mean is quite
well behaved wheh turned upside down: the geometric mean of a and b is -ab, and
the geometric mean of -L and -L is -. The arithmetic and harmonic means behave
a b V ab
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1930 CENSUS
Smallest Harmonic Equal Major Greatest










Smallest Harmonic Equal Major Greatest
Divisors Mean Proportions Fractions Divisors
3 3 3 3 3
39 36 36 33 28
250 248 248 250 249
143 148 148 149 155
very badly, however, -when stood on their heads-an understandable shortcoming. The
; a+b1 1arithmetic mean of a and b is a -- but instead of the arithmetic mean of I and Ib being
22 , bti a
2 ,itis .---. The harmonic mean suffers from the same difficulty. This explains
a+b b
the versatility and ready reversibility of equal proportions.
52. The tables are taken from ScnYEcmDriE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 65. A similar
grouping of the results of each of the five methods in apportioning according to 1948





Very small states 3 3 3 3 3
Small states 24 12 22 22 15
Medium-sized states 192 1S9 188 18 18
Large states 216 221 __ 2? 229
See Appendix B, infra, p. 13.
Chafee, supra note 2, presents two interesting hypothetical e.amples which illustrate
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It has been argued that the discrimination of the method of major fractions
in favor of large states is justifiable since it would help counteract the dis-
crimination in favor of small states in the Senate. 3 The clear wording of the
Constitution refutes such an argument, and there is nothing in the debates
of the Constitutional Convention, or in the first, or "constitutional" ap-
portionment, to justify favoring large states in the House. 4
POLITICAL FACTORS IN APPORTIONMENT
Despite the mathematical superiority of the method of equal proportions,
it would be naive to assume that its continued use by Congress is assured.
It has previously been shown that in 1941 the method of equal proportions
would have given Arkansas seven representatives and Michigan seventeen,
while the method of major fractions would have allotted six to Arkansas
and eighteen to Michigan.55 Congress chose at that time to give the extra
seat to Arkansas, and thus to use the method of equal proportions." But
this decision had nothing whatsoever to do with the mathematical or logical
soundness of equal proportions. Arkansas is usually a safe Democratic
state; Michigan's normal leanings are Republican. Every Democrat in
Congress, except those from Michigan, voted for equal proportions and an
extra seat for Arkansas. Every Republican voted for major fractions and
an extra seat for Michigan. There were more Democrats in Congress than
Republicans. Thus equal proportions.
The table in an appendix showing the results of each of the modern methods
of apportionment when 1948 population estimates are used 11 gives some
insight into the political factors which may be operative in choosing a method
of apportionment after the next census. Equal proportions and major frac-
tions happen to give identical results, and the only difference between those
two methods and the harmonic mean method is that the latter gives one
more seat to Colorado, a politically undecided state, and one less seat to
Texas, which is invariably Democratic. The method of smallest divisors
53. SCHMECMEIER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 72; Chafee, supra note 2, at 1041-2.
54. "A second-test ... is suggested by the original object of apportionment. This.
was to give the more populous states the larger representation in the House to which their
numbers were thought to entitle them and which they did not receive in the Senate. From
the fundamental purpose of apportionment it follows that a method giving the populous
states systematically either more members or fewer members per unit of population than
the small states is incorrect. We have, then, two criteria, of a just and constitutional ap-
portionment: . . . secondly, the method must hold the scales even between the large and
the small states." Willcox, The Apportionment of Representatives, 6 Am. EcoN. Rtv.
Supp. 3, 6-7 (1916).
55. See pp. 1379-80 supra.
56. 55 STAr. 762 (1941), 2 U. S. C. §2b (1946).
57. See table, Appendix B, infra, p. 1386. The population figures on which the ap-
portionment in the table is based are estimates by the Bureau of the Census of the popula-
tion by states as of July 1, 1948, and are found in the Nav INTERNATIONAL YrAR Boo
444 (1949).
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also favors the Republicans, while the method of greatest divisors is even
more favorable to the Democrats. 3
Another political factor which may be even more forceful than party
loyalty is that of state pride. Very few representatives feel so versed in
mathematics, or so devoted to their party, that they would be willing to
return to their home state and try to explain a vote in favor of a method of
apportionment which deprived that state of a seat or seats it otherwise would
have gotten. This factor would seem to militate very strongly against ac-
ceptance by the House of an apportionment made by the method of smallest
divisors or the harmonic mean, less strongly against the method of equal
proportions and major fractions, and very strongly in favor of apportion-
ment by the method of greatest divisors.
9
But even if the method of greatest divisors is used, state pride would still
lend impetus to movements to increase the size of the House. Depending
upon the method of apportionment employed, from eleven to seventeen
states would lose seats in a House of 435. The amount of opposition to
keeping the size of the House at that figure would be less if greatest divisors
were used than if any other method were employed, but the opposition
would still be strong enough to be significant."3
58. On the assumption that where a state gains a seat, the extra seat will go to the
party controlling the state legislature, and that where a state loses a seat, the seat vill
be taken, when possible, from the party in the minority in the legislature, and further
assuming that the division between the parties would otherwise be identical with that in
the present Congress, the political consequences of each of the methods of apportionment
would be as follows:
Republicans Dcmocrats
Present division 171 264
Smallest divisors 178 257
Harmonic mean 178 257
Equal proportions 177 258
Major fractions 177 258
Greatest divisors 175 260
59. Seventeen states have the same quota under any method of apportiument, and the
state pride factor is therefore not present in their calculations. On the assumption that
all of the present representatives from each of the other thirty-one states would vote for
that method of apportionment which gives their state its largest quota, and against any
method of apportionment which reduces their state's quota, the following numbers of votes
are believed to be committed for and against each of the methods of apportionment:
For Against
Smallest divisors 40 1S
Harmonic mean 16 163
Equal proportions 33 140
Major fractions 33 140
Greatest divisors 19S 34
60. Eight states would lose a seat by any method of apportionment in a House of 435,
and they would seem to provide a solid bloc of 76 votes committed to increasing the size
of the House. The number of votes in the present House of the states which would lose
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CONCLUSION
The method of equal proportions is the best method of apportionment of
the House yet devised. Most desirably, that method would be used to ap-
portion the smallest House in which no state would lose a member. But the
choice, after the 1950 census as after every census, is more likely to be
dictated by considerations of political expediency and state pride. Indica-
tions are that at the next apportionment those factors would favor use of
the method of greatest divisors, regardless of whether the size of the House
is increased. When seats in Congress and electoral votes are at stake, the
mathematician is subordinated to the politician.
APPENDIx A
CONSTRUCION OF A PRioRiTY LiST
The following method is used to construct a priority list by the method of
greatest divisors for four states: A, with a population of 1,000,000; B, with a population
of 750,000; C, with a population of 200,000; and D with a population of 100,000. The
multipliers for the method of greatest divisors are found from a table to be:
.5000 0000 .1111 1111
.3333 3333 .1000 0000
.2500 0000 .0909 0909
.2000 0000 .0833 3333
.1666 6667 .0769 2308
.1428 5714 .0714 2857
.1250 0000 .0666 6667
etc.
Multiplying the population of each state by each of these multipliers in turn gives lists
which look like the following':
State A State B State C Slate D
pop. 1,000,000 pop. 500,000 pop. 200,000 pop. 100,000
500,000 375,000 100,000 50,000














These rank indices are then arranged in one list in order of their size, after first allowing
one representative for each state to comply with the constitutional requirement.
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Any size House is now readily apportioned merely by giving each state the number of
seats opposite its name the last time it appeared in the list up to the point representing
the desired size House. Thus in a House of 30, A would be alloted 15 seats, B 11 seats,
C 3 seats, and D 1 seat. The apportionment in a House of 20 would be A-10, E-7,
C-2, and D-1, ,with B entitled to the next seat if it should be decided to increase the
size of the House.
Since the population of this hypothetical nation is 2,0E0,000, the natural ratio for a
House of 20 seats is 102,500. When a priority list is used, the artificial ratio may be any
figure between the rank index opposite the number of the total House and the ranlk index
for the next largest size of the House. In this case any number between 100,000 and
93,750 will suffice as an artificial ratio, but the customary procedure is to choose the
figure halfway between the tw;o rank indices, which in this case is 96,875. If this artificial
ratio is divided into the population of any state, the number of seats which the state should
be given in a House of 20 -will be the whole number in the exact quota, the fractions being
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APPENDIX B
Estimated QUOTA COWLUTED FZOM 1948 POPULATION DY:
State Population Present Smallest Harmonic Equal Major Greatest
7-1-48 Allotment Divisors Mean Proportions Fradions Ditisors
Alabama 2,848,000 9 9 8 8 8 8
Arizona 664,000 2 2 2 2 2 2
Arkansas 1,925,000 7 6 6 6 6 6
California 10,031,000 23 29 30 30 30 31
Colorado 1,165,000 4 4 4 3 3 3
Connecticut 2,011,000 6 6 6 6 6 6
Delaware 297,000 1 1 1 1 1 1
Florida 2,356,000 6 7 7 7 7 7
Georgia 3,128,000 10 9 9 9 9 9
Idaho 530,000 2 2 2 2 2 1
Illinois 8,670,000 26 25 26 26 26 27
Indiana 3,909,000 11 12 12 12 12 12
Iowa 2,625,000 8 8 8 8 8 8
Kansas 1,968,000 6 6 6 6 6 6
Kentucky 2,819,000 9 8 8 8 8 8
Louisiana 2,576,000 8 8 8 8 8 8
Maine 900,000 3 3 3 3 3 2
Maryland 2,148,000 6 7 6 6 6 6
Massachusetts 4,718,000 14 14 14 14 14 14
Michigan 6,195,000 17 18 18 18 18 19
Minnesota 2,940,000 9 9 9 9 9 9
Mississippi 2,121,000 7 6 6 6 6 6
Missouri 3,947,000 13 12 12 12 12 12
Montana 511,000 2 2 2 2 2 1
Nebraska 1,301,000 4 4 4 4 4 4
Nevada 142,000 1 1 1 1 1 1
New Hampshire 548,000 2 2 2 2 2 1
New Jersey 4,729,000 14 14 14 14 14 14
New Mexico 571,000 2 2 2 2 2 1
New York 14,386,000 45 41 43 43 43 45
North Carolina 3,715,000 12 11 11 11 11 11
North Dakota 560,000 2 2 2 2 2 1
Ohio 7,799,000 23 23 23 23 23 24
Oklahoma 2,362,000 8 7 7 7 7 7
Oregon 1,626,000 4 5 5 5 5 5
Pennsylvania 10,689,000 33 31 32 32 32 33
Rhode Island 748,000 2 3 2 2 2 2
South Carolina 1,991,000 6 6 6 6 6 6
South Dakota 623,000 2 2 2 2 2 1
Tennessee 3,149,000 10 9 9 9 9 9
Texas 7,230,000 21 21 21 22 22 22
Utah 655,000 2 2 2 2 2 2
Vermont 374,000 1 2 1 1 1 1
Virginia 3,029,000 9 9 9 9 9 9
Washington 2,487,000 6 8 7 7 7 7
West Virginia 1,915,000 6 6 6 6 6 6
Wisconsin 3,309,000 10 10 10 10 10 10
Wyoming 275,000 1 1 1 1 1 1
Number of states with:
Increased quota - 9 6 7 7 9
Decreased quota - 11 11 12 12 17
Unchanged quota - 28 31 29 29 22
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